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AGENDA-SETTING POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS
WITH OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS OF PLAYERS
ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
Abstract. This paper presents an analysis of the allocation of
agenda-setting (or bargaining) power in organizations with over-
lapping generations of players. Such powers are typically institu-
tionalized within an organization’s structure, and, given the focus
of this paper, we identify the former with the latter. Our anal-
ysis concerns organizations (such as the US Senate) in which the
number of periods each player participates is endogenously deter-
mined by his or her past performance. We derive several results
and insights concerning (i) optimal organizational structure and
(ii) conditions under which the unique, dynamically optimal out-
come can be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations with sub-
optimal structures. For example, we show that under a broad set
of conditions, the optimal organizational structure should involve
a seniority system, in which most of the agenda-setting power is
allocated to the oldest generation of players.
“The future is purchased by the present; it is not possible to
secure distant or permanent happiness but by the forbear-
ance of some immediate gratification.” Samuel Johnson
1. Introduction
Most organizations are long-lived, while the players who participate
in them are not. Moreover, in some of these organizations players of
different generations overlap. The US Senate in which legislators have
staggered terms of office is a case in point.1 It is perhaps intuitive
that in such organizations the incentives of players of different gen-
erations will differ. This, in turn, may have implications for optimal
organizational structure.
An important feature of some of these organizations is that the num-
ber of periods any particular player participates is endogenously deter-
mined by his or her past performance. This is often the case when the
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1In this legislative body a generation is a cohort of politicians who share a com-
mon re-election date.
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player is an agent for an external principal who exercises the power
to retain the agent’s services or fire her, depending upon agent perfor-
mance during her previous “contract”. For example, in the US Senate
the likelihood that a legislator is re-elected on any particular occasion
depends on the benefits the member managed to bring to the con-
stituency during his or her term of office. Indeed, in this circumstance
it is plausible to suggest that the intertemporal flow of benefits affects
the re-election probability, with the electorate placing greater weight
on more recently delivered benefits than on those delivered earlier in
the legislator’s term. We call this the “What Have You Done For Me
Lately” (or WHYDFML) Principle, a principle which lies at the heart
of our model, analysis and results.
A fundamental aspect of any such organization is the allocation of
agenda-setting (or bargaining) power amongst players. Such powers,
which crucially determine and shape the outcome and performance of
the organization in question, are typically institutionalized within the
organization’s structure. Although, of course, the organizational struc-
ture deals with other issues as well, given the focus of this paper it
is convenient to identify the organizational structure with the alloca-
tion of such powers. There are two central questions that we aim to
address in this paper. First, what are the properties of the optimal
organizational structure, and how does it depend on the underlying
parameters? Second, under what conditions, if any, can the dynam-
ically optimal outcome be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations
with suboptimal structures? The latter question is important due to
the persistence (in the real world) of such suboptimal structures in
some organizations.2 We develop our answers to these questions in the
context of a simple model with assumptions deliberately chosen in or-
der to develop our main results and insights in a simplified and focused
manner.
Our model considers an organization which operates over an infi-
nite number of periods with overlapping generations of players, where
the number of periods each player participates in it is endogenously
determined (along the lines indicated above). In each period, players
from different generations encounter a “bargaining situation”, which is
a situation in which they have a common interest to co-operate, but
conflicting interests over exactly how to do so. They thus engage in
2In his classic treatise, North (1990), Douglass North develops the thesis that the
persistence of inefficient institutions may be explained by the presence of various
kinds of “transactions costs”. This is the thrust of Coase’s argument — namely, that
the presence of transactions costs weakens the tendency toward otherwise efficient
adaptations.
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negotiations according to a procedure that is institutionalized within
the framework of the organization’s structure.
Given our assumption that players have symmetric information about
the parameters of the bargaining situation, it is not surprising that in
equilibrium the players strike an agreement. However, the equilibrium
distribution of the gains from co-operation — which is determined by
the players’ relative bargaining powers (which, in turn, are determined
in part by the bargaining procedure) — may not be optimal (or effi-
cient) from a dynamic perspective. Indeed, static efficiency need not
imply dynamic efficiency. While the former is achieved because players
in each period strike an agreement, the latter requires them to strike
a particular agreement, one which is “optimal” from an intertemporal
perspective. This is because of the WHYDFML Principle.
Given the above observation, we then characterize the optimal al-
location of bargaining (or agenda-setting) power amongst players of
different generations (i.e., the optimal organizational structure), one
which does sustain, in equilibrium, the (unique) dynamically optimal
distribution of the gains from co-operation. Our analysis unearths a
close and deep connection between optimal organizational structure
and what we call the probability-of-survival function, a function which
formalizes theWHYDFML Principle. We show that under some condi-
tions on this function, all the bargaining power should optimally reside
with the oldest generation of players. Thus, it is optimal to design the
organization’s structure in such a way that all the agenda-setting power
is vested in the oldest generation of players. To put it differently, it is
optimal to institute a seniority system. If, on the other hand, those
conditions are not met, then it is optimal for each generation of players
to have some agenda-setting power. However, even in that case, most
of the power should optimally reside with the oldest generation of play-
ers, which may be interpreted as a weak form of a seniority system, but
a seniority system nevertheless.
As noted above, in some organizations with a suboptimal structure,
it might not be possible to replace it with the optimal one. The persis-
tence of inefficient (or suboptimal) institutions is commonplace. One
explanation for this is based on the notion that powerful players may
have a vested interest in maintaining a suboptimal organizational struc-
ture; for further discussion and analysis of this point, see, for example,
Bardhan (2001) and Busch and Muthoo (2002). Given the importance
of this issue, we thus explore whether or not the dynamically optimal
outcome can be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations with sub-
optimal structures. We show that under some conditions, it is possible
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to do so. These conditions entail, in particular, the presence of a dis-
interested “third party” within the organization’s structure, who has
the ability and the incentive to honestly communicate key information
about the (recent) history of the organization to new generations of
players. This is because in such an organization with a suboptimal
structure, a dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained only via an
equilibrium in which the players’ equilibrium actions are conditioned
on some aspects of the history. As such one requires the presence of a
disinterested “third party” because the new generations of players can-
not (by definition) have observed the actions taken before their birth
into the organization — that is, they don’t have, what may be called,
perfect observability about the history of the organization — and at
the same time, the old generations of players may have an incentive to
lie to them about those actions.
Indeed, to put it differently, we show that in an organization with
a suboptimal structure, the dynamically optimal outcome is sustain-
able via the mechanism of inter-generational co-operation, but this is
possible only when the organization has a disinterested “third party”
who acts as a surrogate for perfect observability. It should be noted
that, in contrast, dynamic optimality is sustainable in organizations
with the optimal structure by definition, and is not based on any form
of inter-generational co-operation.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the related literature. Section 3 lays down our model, and
presents a preliminary result. Section 4 studies the issue of the op-
timal allocation of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power. Section 5
studies the issue of sustaining the unique, dynamically optimal out-
come in organizations with suboptimal structures. Section 6 studies
a simple extension of our model in which the size of the gains from
co-operation in any period is randomly realized at the beginning of the
period in question. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the
issue of the optimal allocation of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power
in organizations with overlapping generations. That such power mat-
ters is of course well recognized by scholars from a variety of disciplines
including economics, politics, sociology and business administration.
Indeed, the role of such power in a wide variety of situations has been
analyzed and studied in a vast number of models; for instance, see
Muthoo (1999) and Doron and Sened (2001) (and references therein)
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for examples of a small selection of these studies in economics and poli-
tics, respectively. These studies have obtained many important results
and insights concerning the impact of the players’ relative bargaining
powers on various economic and political outcomes, but have taken
such powers as given (often because it makes sense to do so in the
context under consideration).
There is a small, but recently growing literature on repeated games
with overlapping generations of players. The first example of this kind
of dynamic game was studied in Samuelson (1958); see also Hammond
(1975). For a discussion of the recent literature, see Bhaskar (1998)
and Lagunoff and Matsui (2001). Our model may be differentiated
from this class of games, however, in that OLG repeated games involve
players who live for a finite and exogenously given number of periods,
whereas a key feature of our model is the endogenous determination of
the number of periods a player lives as a consequence of his or her past
performance.3
There are two papers in the political science literature which are
somewhat related to ours (in terms of some ideas, some aspects of the
analysis and some results), namely, McKelvey and Riezman (1992) and
Shepsle, Dickson and Van Houweling (2000).4
McKelvey and Riezman (1992) study a stochastic game model of
a legislature with a fixed number (greater than or equal to three) of
infinitely lived players (or legislators). In each period, the three or
more legislators bargain over the partition of a unit-size cake according
to a version of the bargaining model studied in Baron and Ferejohn
(1989).5 The authors construct a stationary equilibrium in which voters
in each period choose to re-elect their incumbent legislator (instead of
replacing him or her with a new representative) and legislators then
agree among themselves to institute a “seniority system” (one which
3Both our model and those in the repeated-game literature, however, share
a focus on sustaining dynamically efficient equilibria via inter-generational co-
operation. Formally speaking, our model is a stochastic game, though the literature
on stochastic games has not studied environments with overlapping generations of
players. It has studied fairly general classes of stochastic games, but all with a fixed
number of infinitely lived players.
4We should also like to draw attention to the paper by Diermeier (1995), who
shows — in the context of a multistage game involving an overlapping generations
of legislators who employ a majoritarian decision rule — how various legislative in-
stitutional norms and arrangements (committee specialization and floor deference)
can be sustained in equilibrium.
5Baron and Ferejohn’s bargaining model extends Rubinstein’s (alternating-
offers) bargaining model to three or more players, but with the proviso that agree-
ment does not require unanimity.
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privileges legislators with previous terms of service over newly elected
legislators by giving the former greater agenda power). A game of
divide-the-cake (as in Baron-Ferejohn, 1989) then commences, and the
period ends. The “incumbency effect” in the electoral game (re-electing
incumbents) occurs because the “seniority effect” (is anticipated to)
occur(s) in the legislature.
Out-of-equilibrium there may exist in some period some junior leg-
islators — that is, those whom voters chose instead of re-electing their
incumbent legislators. This would then give real substance to a se-
niority system (by differentially privileging seniors over these junior
legislators in terms of agenda power). In contrast, in the stationary
equilibrium that is constructed in the McKelvey-Riezman paper, all
legislators are senior (i.e., incumbents) and the seniority system has
no effect on final distribution (since all legislators now have symmetric
agenda power). Observationally, the concept of “seniority” has bite
only when there are both seniors and juniors. (Of course, the seniority
system nevertheless does make a difference, even if it is observation-
ally invisible, because it sustains the propensity of voters to re-elect
incumbents.)
While there are many differences between our model and analysis and
that of McKelvey and Riezman (1992), four are fundamental and worth
emphasizing. First, they are not concerned with optimal organizational
structure, but with the equilibrium consequences of a particular orga-
nizational structure. Second, in their model each player is infinitely
lived and, moreover, every legislator faces his voters in each period. In
our model, on the other hand, it is only the oldest generation of players
who face re-election at the end of each period. Third, in their model
whether or not an incumbent is re-elected at the end of any period
depends essentially on cake that would be obtained in the future (i.e,
in the next period). In contrast, in our model, success in re-elections
depends on a retrospective assessment by voters of cake obtained in the
past, with the WHYDFML Principle lying at the heart of this matter.
Fourth and finally, in the equilibrium of the McKelvey-Riezman model
there are only re-elected “old” legislators, whereas in the equilibrium of
our model there is a mix of experienced and inexperienced legislators.
Shepsle, Dickson and Van Houweling (2000) study a dynamic model
of bargaining in the US Senate over the allocation of pork-barrel projects
that involves three generations of legislators — just (re)elected sena-
tors, those in the middle two years of their (six-year) term, and those
in the two years preceding an election. Like McKelvey and Riezman
(1992), their analysis concerns the equilibrium consequences of a par-
ticular organizational structure — they use a version of the bargaining
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model studied in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Although they don’t
address the issue of the optimal organizational structure, some of the
key ideas underlying their model (such as the WHYDFML Principle)
underlie ours as well.
In some respects our model is a generalization of theirs. But, in order
to conduct an analysis of such a model in a tractable manner (especially
in connection with the issue of the optimal organizational structure),
we restrict attention to organizations in which in any period there are
two generations of players. Although there are some examples where
this assumption is appropriate, in some organizations there are three
(or more) generations of players present in any given period (such as in
the US Senate, the case studied in their paper). Moving from the two
generations case to the three (or more) generations case introduces a
conceptually new dimension to the problem, namely, that of “coalition
formation” amongst players of different generations. In order to focus
attention on the other strategic elements present in the kind of dynamic
situation studied here, and derive a deeper understanding of them, it
is theoretically productive to first analyze the two generations case.
Besides being of independent interest, this should make the analysis
and understanding of the three generations case easier.
3. The Model
3.1. Framework. We consider a strategic environment which oper-
ates over an infinite number of periods with overlapping generations of
players. In each period t ∈ {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . .}, two players bargain over
the partition of a unit-size “cake” (or surplus) according to a procedure
specified below, in section 3.3. The two players belong to different gen-
erations: one player is “young” while the other is “old”. The period-t
young player is the period-(t+ 1) old player.
At the end of period t, the period-t old player faces the possibility
of “death”: if he dies then a new player is immediately born who is
the period-(t + 1) young player, but if he does not die then he is the
period-(t+1) young player.6 The probability that a period-t old player
survives death depends on the amounts of cake he obtained in periods
t and t− 1. More precisely, this probability is Π(xy, xo), where xy and
xo are respectively the amounts of cake he obtained when he was young
6The concepts of “young” and “old” are period specific. It should therefore
be noted that the “date of birth” of the period-t young player can be any time
s ∈ {t, t − 2, t − 4, . . .}. Indeed, when we refer to a player as the period-t young
player, it means that the player in question will be alive in periods t and t+ 1 for
sure, and then, at the end of period t+ 1, the player faces the possibility of death.
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(in period t− 1) and when he was old (in period t). The assumptions
that we adopt on this probability-of-survival function Π are stated and
discussed below, in section 3.2.
The payoff per period for a player is b > 0. It may thus be noted
that xy and xo are pure instruments of “survival”, and provide no
direct utility.7 Each player’s objective is to maximize the expected
present value of his payoffs, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is his time discount factor.
For notational convenience, in what follows we sometimes call a young
player, “player y”, and an old player, “player o”.
3.2. Assumptions on the Probability-of-Survival Function. We
make two assumptions about each agent’s probability of survival, which
we maintain throughout our analysis. First, we assume that Π is
strictly increasing in each of its two arguments, which means that the
probability of survival is higher the more cake the player obtains either
when young or when old. A formal statement of this assumption is as
follows:
Assumption 1 (Π is strictly increasing in each of its two arguments).
For any arbitrary pairs x1 = (x1y, x
1
o) and x
2 = (x2y, x
2
o) such that x
1
y ≥
x2y, x
1
o ≥ x2o, and either x1y > x2y or x1o > x2o, it is the case that Π(x1) >
Π(x2).
Assumption 1 could be stated in a relatively more straightforward
manner if we were to assume that Π is differentiable. With such an
additional assumption, Assumption 1 could be stated as follows: for
any pair x = (xy, xo), Πi(x) > 0 (i = y, o), where Πi denotes the
derivative of Π w.r.t. xi. However, our analysis and results do not
require that Π be differentiable. As such there is no need to make this
assumption. In fact, we will not even require that Π be continuous.
This allows us to explore the implications of a richer class of probability-
of-survival functions. For example, we can analyze the potential impact
of the assumption that the probability of survival jumps (upwards, of
course) at some critical values of xy and/or xo.
While Assumption 1 is an obvious assumption to make, our next as-
sumption is not. This second assumption concerns the “What Have
You Done For Me Lately”(or WHYDFML) Principle. As we indi-
cated above in section 1, this principle requires that the probability-of-
survival function place relatively greater weight on cake obtained when
7In effect, they provide utility to the player’s principal, in that way influencing
the player’s probability of survival.
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old than that obtained when young.8 There is some choice in how one
formally encapsulates this principle in terms of properties on the Π
function. Although our formulation (stated below in Assumption 2)
might be considered to be somewhat “weaker” than what is implied by
theWHYDFML Principle, it captures the main thrust of this principle.
We first state our assumption, and then discuss it.
Assumption 2 (The WHYDFML Principle). For any arbitrary pair
x = (xy, xo), and for an arbitrarily small ∆ > 0, Π(xy, xo + ∆) >
Π(xy +∆, xo).
It is perhaps instructive to note first that if we were to assume that
Π is differentiable, then Assumption 2 could alternatively be stated as
follows: for any pair x = (xy, xo), Π2(x) > Π1(x), where Πi denotes
the derivative of Π w.r.t. xi (i = y, o). In words, this states that the
marginal probability of survival from cake obtained when old is strictly
greater than the marginal probability of survival from cake obtained
when young.
It is straightforward to verify that Assumption 2 implies that for
any arbitrary pair x = (xy, xo), and for any arbitrarily small ∆ > 0,
Π(xy −∆, xo +∆) > Π(xy, xo).9 Using this observation recursively, it
immediately follows that for any pair (xy, xo), Π(0, xy+xo) > Π(xy, xo).
This result establishes that theWHYDFML Principle, as formulated in
Assumption 2, implies that in terms of maximizing his or her survival
probability, a player prefers, ceteris paribus, to have all of the cake that
he obtains when young given to him when old.
3.3. Bargaining Procedure. Our central objective is to explore the
impact of alternative allocations of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power
on equilibrium outcomes, and thus be able to characterize the optimal
allocation of such power (which, in this paper, we identify with the
optimal organizational structure). In order to achieve this objective in
a simplified manner, we adopt the following well-known procedure of
bargaining.
8We take this “recency bias” as given exogenously, and make no claims as to
its optimality for the principal. As a behavioral matter, recency biases are often
in evidence and we seek to trace their consequences here. However, it would be
fruitful to extend our analysis by modeling the principal (voters) explicitly in order
to endogenize the properties of Π.
9Here is a formal proof. Fix an arbitrary pair x = (xy, xo), and an arbitrarily
small ∆ > 0. Now define x′y = xy − ∆ and x′o = xo. Assumption 2 implies that
Π(x′y, x
′
o + ∆) > Π(x
′
y + ∆, x
′
o). The desired conclusion follows after substituting
for the (defined) values of x′y and x
′
o.
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With probability θ, where θ ∈ [0, 1], the young player makes a “take-
it-or-leave-it” offer to the old player, and with probability 1−θ it is the
old player who makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the young player.
By a “take-it-or-it-leave-it” offer, it is meant that one player makes
an offer which the other player either accepts or rejects. In the former
case agreement is struck. In the latter case no agreement is reached,
and moreover, no counteroffers can be made; it is “as if” the cake
for the period in question “disappears” after the offer is rejected. Or,
alternatively, the rejection of an offer means that an (inefficient) status
quo remains in place during the period in question.10 Having provided
two possible interpretations of the consequences of rejecting the single
offer, we argue that in fact this procedure need not (and should not) be
given a literal interpretation. It can be interpreted as a “reduced form”
of more complex procedures which allow for offers and counteroffers;
on this point, see Muthoo (1999).11 The great advantage of this simple
procedure is that it captures in a tractable manner the full range of
allocations of bargaining (or agenda-setting) powers.
Notice that θ parameterizes the allocation of such power. If θ = 0
then the old player has all the power, while the exact opposite is the
case if θ = 1. Furthermore, if 0 < θ < 1 then each generation has
some power. The greater the value of θ the more power is vested in the
young player. It seems appropriate, indeed convenient, to treat θ as a
characterization of seniority in which θ = 0 describes a pure seniority
system and θ < 0.5 as a seniority system more generally.12
3.4. Informational Assumptions. We plausibly assume that each
player does not and/or cannot have knowledge of the entire history of
the organization; for that would require knowledge, in particular, of all
the actions taken before his birth into the organization (which includes
actions taken by players who, at the time of his birth, would be long
dead). At best, a player might learn of actions that were taken some
finite number of periods before his birth. As such we adopt the plausible
10Where the amount of cake obtained by each player in such a status quo is
normalized to zero.
11We specify the bargaining procedure in our model as of the take-it-or-leave-it
variety and treat this procedure as exogenously given. An extension of the argument
developed below suggests that this is the procedure that optimizing agents would
arrive at if a procedure were not specified exogneously. It is part of an “optimal
organization.”
12It should however be observed that in other contexts seniority is taken as a
measure of the number of terms served in office, and not tenure within any single
term.
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assumption that, in any period, each player has limited observability
(or imperfect information) about the history of the game.
Furthermore, we adopt the complete information assumption, which
is an informational assumption about the game itself: the structure and
the payoffs that define our game are assumed to be common knowledge
amongst all players. Thus, in particular, the values of all the parame-
ters — which include b, δ, Π and θ — are common knowledge amongst
all players.
3.5. Preliminary Result. Bhaskar (1998) studies a class of repeated
games with overlapping generations of players in which the number of
periods each player lives is finite and exogenously given. He shows that
if players have limited observability about the history of the game, then
in any equilibrium players must be using stationary strategies. Subject
to some minor alterations, the argument in Bhaskar (1998) carries over
to our stochastic game model in which the number of periods a player
lives is endogenously determined as part of the equilibrium. As such
we have the following preliminary result which informs our analysis:
Lemma 1. The limited observability assumption implies that in any
subgame perfect equilibrium, players must be using stationary strategies.
The intuition behind this result is as follows.13 The limited observ-
ability assumption implies that for any player in any period t, there will
exist some player in some future period s > t such that the period-s
player has no information about the history of the game before period
t that the period-t player does have. But this means that the period-
s player cannot condition his action in period s on that part of the
history. Now, the only reason that the period-t player would condi-
tion his action in period t on that part of the history is if players in
the future would as well. Hence, history-dependant behaviour cannot
be sustained in equilibrium — because players in different time peri-
ods have asymmetric (or differential) information about the history of
game.14
13A formal proof of this lemma, which is available upon request from the au-
thors, is based on an inductive argument on the degree of player observability of
history (formally, on the number of periods of player memory). The argument is
an adaptation of the argument in Bhaskar (1998).
14To further illustrate this intuition, suppose, for example, that each player in
any period t knows the history of play in the preceding m periods, where m is large
but finite. And suppose, contrary to Lemma 1, that there exists an equilibrium in
which in some period t two players condition their respective period-t actions on
the actions taken in the previous period, t − 1, which they in principle can (since
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4. Optimal Organizational Structure
Given Lemma 1, we restrict attention to stationary subgame perfect
equilibria. In any such equilibrium the players’ bargaining behaviour in
any period (and hence the outcome of the negotiations in any period)
is independent of the history of the game up until that period. It is
therefore intuitive that in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (in
which current actions have no affect on future equilibrium play), the
player who is (randomly) chosen to make the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer
would demand and receive all the cake. Thus, the result stated in
the following proposition is intuitive (and straightforward to formally
establish, which is done in the Appendix):
Lemma 2. Fix θ ∈ [0, 1]. There exists a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium in which in each period all of the unit-size cake is obtained by
the player who makes the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. The equilibrium
expected payoff to a young player is
W (θ) =
b(1 + δ)
1− δ2pi(θ) , where
pi(θ) = θ2Π(1, 0) + θ(1− θ)Π(1, 1) + (1− θ)θΠ(0, 0) + (1− θ)2Π(0, 1).
Proof. In the Appendix. 
The equilibrium expected probability of survival, pi(θ), depends on
whether or not a player gets to make the offer when young and whether
or not he gets to make the offer when old. As such there are four
possible outcomes, as is reflected in the expression for pi(θ). Notice
that not surprisingly, a young player’s equilibrium expected payoff —
which is identical to the equilibrium expected payoff of a newly born
player — depends on the value of θ.
The optimal organizational structure is defined to be the value of
θ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes the equilibrium expected payoff W (θ). This
maximization problem is solved in the Appendix, and we obtain our
first main result:
they both can observe the actions taken in the preceding period). Now consider
some distant future period s, which is larger than t +m. The newly born, young
period-s player will not know the actions take in period t − 1, since he will only
know the history of play in the preceding m periods. Hence, in period s, he will
not know the state in which play is, which is a contradiction (i.e., it contradicts
the supposition that such an equilibrium can exist in which some players use non-
stationary strategies).
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Proposition 1. Define the following inequality:
(1)
1
2
Π(1, 1) +
1
2
Π(0, 0) > Π(0, 1).
(i) If Π satisfies inequality 1, then there exists a θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
W (.) is maximized at θ = θ∗, where
θ∗ =
Π(1, 1) + Π(0, 0)− 2Π(0, 1)
2[Π(1, 1) + Π(0, 0)− Π(0, 1)− Π(1, 0)] .
(ii) If Π does not satisfy inequality 1, then W (.) is maximized at θ = 0.
Proof. In the Appendix. 
The (large) class of probability-of-survival functions satisfying As-
sumptions 1 and 2 can be divided in two, mutually exclusive (and
exhaustive) subclasses: functions in one subclass satisfy inequality 1,
while functions in the other subclass don’t. Each of these subclasses
will contain a large number of probability-of-survival functions. It is
of course not possible to argue in the abstract that one or the other
of these two subclasses contains the most plausible and/or the most
relevant probability-of-survival functions. In some real-life situations
inequality 1 will be satisfied, while in other situations it will not, de-
pending in particular on the degree of importance attached to cake
obtained when young. For instance, in the context of the US Senate, if
voters attach much signficance to cake obtained in both periods (to the
extent, for example, that Π(1, 1) > 2Π(0, 1)) then inequality 1 would
be satisfied.15
Proposition 1(ii) has established that if the probability-of-survival
function does not satisfy inequality 1, e.g., Π concave, then the opti-
mal organizational structure involves allocating all the agenda-setting
(or bargaining) power to the old player. That is, as defined in section
3.3, a seniority system should optimally be instituted within the or-
ganization’s structure. This holds for any arbitrarily small amount of
15We re-emphasize that our results, including Proposition 1, do not require that
Π be continuous. Indeed, in some real-life situations, Π may jump (upwards, of
course) at some critical values of xy and xo. For instance, this might be the case
in situations where the probability-of-survival function is derived from some equi-
librium models of electoral competition. It may also be worth noting that if Π
is concave — which might be the case in some situations (and which, of course,
implies that Π is differentiable almost everywhere, hence continuous) — then in-
equality 1 is not satisfied; since if Π is concave then the LHS of inequality 1 is less
than or equal to Π(1/2, 1/2), which, by Assumption 2, is strictly less than the RHS
of inequality 1. However, if, for example, Π is sufficiently convex then inequality 1
would be satisfied.
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recency bias as specified in Assumption 2. We state this result in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. If the probability-of-survival function does not satisfy in-
equality 1, then the optimal organizational structure involves allocating
all the agenda-setting (or bargaining) power to the old player; that is,
to institute a seniority system.
Proposition 1(i) establishes that the equilibrium expected payoff
W (.) is higher when both the young and the old players have some
bargaining power than when all the power is allocated to either gener-
ation of players. When both players have some agenda-setting power,
then, in equilibrium, with positive probability a player obtains the
whole unit-size cake both when he is young and when he is old. When
Π satisfies inequality 1, this prospect is sufficiently attractive to com-
pensate for the fact that with positive probability he will obtain no
cake when young and no cake when old, and with positive probability
the whole cake when young but no cake when old.
It is easy to verify that θ∗ is strictly less than 0.5; and that is the
case because of Assumption 2 (the WHYDFML Principle). This re-
sult indicates that even when it is optimal to allocate some bargaining
power to the young player, most of it should reside with the old player.
This could be interpreted as a weak form of the seniority system, but
a seniority system nevertheless, in which the old generation of play-
ers have most, if not all, of the agenda setting powers. It can also be
verified that 0.5 − θ∗ is proportional to Π(0, 1) − Π(1, 0), which (by
Assumption 2) is strictly positive. This observation can be interpreted
as follows: the greater the weight placed on cake obtained when old
compared to that obtained when young, the closer is the optimal or-
ganizational structure to the idealized seniority system (in which the
old have literally all the agenda-setting powers). We summarize these
results in the following corollary:
Corollary 2. If the probability-of-survival function satisfies inequality
1, then the optimal organizational structure involves allocating some
agenda-setting (or bargaining) power to each player, but with the old
player receiving a bigger share of that power.
5. Third Parties and Suboptimal Structures
We now turn our attention to organizations with suboptimal orga-
nizational structures; that is, in which the allocation of agenda-setting
AGENDA POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS 15
(or bargaining) power differs from the optimal allocation derived in the
previous section.
5.1. Transactions Costs and Equilibrium Structures. An appli-
cation of Coase’s Theorem would imply that in the absence of transac-
tions costs (or frictions), the players within the organization should be
able to (and would) negotiate amongst themselves to institute the opti-
mal organizational structure. This conclusion can be explicitly derived
as the unique equilibrium of an extended version of our model in which
in each period the two players first negotiate over the value of θ, and
then negotiate over the partition of the unit-size cake. Hence, in the
absence of “transactions costs”, one can establish that the equilibrium
organizational structure is the optimal one.
However, in the presence of certain kinds of transactions costs, the
above conclusion may not hold; the equilibrium organizational struc-
ture can be suboptimal. We don’t propose, in this paper, to formally
derive such a result.16 Instead, we turn to the conditions (if any) under
which the dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained, in equilib-
rium, in an organization with a suboptimal structure. We take as our
starting point the conclusion that the presence of certain transactions
costs imply that this suboptimal organizational structure is the equi-
librium organizational structure.
5.2. Dynamic Efficiency and Suboptimal Structures. By defini-
tion, and given Lemma 1, unless the value of θ is the one stated in
Proposition 1, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our model
is dynamically inefficient (or suboptimal). In order to sustain the
dynamically optimal outcome, it is necessary to employ the mecha-
nism of inter-generational co-operation, which requires the use of non-
stationary (or history-dependent) strategies. But Lemma 1 rules them
out, since players have limited observability about the history of the
game. One mechanism through which players can be provided with the
information about the relevant bits of history is for the organization
16That would entail extending our model in a non-trivial manner. However, we
refer the reader to Busch and Muthoo (2002), who provide an explanation (for the
persistence of inefficient institutions) that may be used as the basis for appropriately
extending our model and formally deriving the desired conclusion. A key ingredient
of their explanation, interpreted in our context, is the notion that a re-allocation
of agenda-setting power, while beneficial on one issue (the one we have modelled
here), may adversely and strategically affect the power of at least one player on a
second issue (which is not modelled here); and thus the player in question may well
have an incentive to maintain the inefficient organizational structure.
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to have a disinterested third party. Such a party has to be disinter-
ested in the sense that he or she should have an incentive to provide
the information truthfully. It should be noted that the old generation
of players may also have the relevant information, but, since they are
active players in the game, they would have an incentive to lie about it
to the new generation of players. The (disinterested) third party acts
as a surrogate for perfect observability. In this section we assume the
existence of such a third party in the organization, and thus, Lemma
1 does not apply.17
In order to illustrate our main insights in a simplified manner, we
analyze the special case in which θ = 1 (i.e., the case in which all the
agenda-setting power is vested in the young player). As can be seen
from Proposition 1, under no circumstances can this be the optimal or-
ganizational structure. Furthermore, we assume that the probability-
of-survival function Π does not satisfy inequality 1, which implies (from
Proposition 1) that the optimal allocation of bargaining power is when
θ = 0 (i.e., when all the power is vested in the old player). So, we
have laid down a case in which the optimal organizational structure is
the “polar opposite” of the equilibrium organizational structure. The
results of this case can be interpreted as a “test” case of the general
issue of the extent to which dynamic optimality is sustainable, in equi-
librium, in organizations with suboptimal organizational structures.
It follows from Lemma 2 that when θ = 1, in the unique stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium, the young player obtains all of the unit-
size cake in each period, and the equilibrium expected payoff to the
young player is
W (1) =
b(1 + δ)
1− δ2Π(1, 0) .
However, it follows from Lemma 2 that when θ = 0, in the unique
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, the old player obtains all of
the unit-size cake in each period, and the equilibrium expected payoff
to the young player is
W (0) =
b(1 + δ)
1− δ2Π(0, 1) .
As we expect, W (0) > W (1) — which is the case since (by Assumption
2) Π(0, 1) > Π(1, 0). So, our objective here is to see whether or not it
17In some organizations, like the US Congress, there are officials — the parlia-
mentarians of the respective chambers — who perform precisely this kind of func-
tion. As disinterested officials who maintain the “official record” and keep track
of precedent, they provide members with information and official interpretation on
the appropriateness of alternative procedural maneuvers.
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state s1 state s2
Young Player offer x = 0 x = 1
Old Player response accept x = 0 accept any offer
transitions switch to state s2
if young player of-
fers x > 0
switch to state s1
immediately after
one offer is made
and is responded
to
Table 1. A non-stationary equilibrium when θ = 1. Notice that
an offer x is a share of the cake to the young player; and thus 1−x
is the old player’s share.
is possible to construct a necessarily non-stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium of our model when θ = 1 such that, in equilibrium in
each period the young player offers all of the unit-size cake to the old
player; that is, which sustains, in equilibrium, the dynamically optimal
outcome.
Consider the strategy profile described in Table 1, using the language
of “states” and “transitions” between such states (which is a compact
way to describe simple non-stationary equilibria).18 Play begins in (the
dynamically optimal) state s1. The young player makes the dynam-
ically optimal offer x = 0 (where x is the share of the cake going to
the young player). Play stays in this state unless an inappropriate ac-
tion is taken (as described under “transitions”). Deviation from this
state by a young player, who asks for some positive share of the cake
(x > 0), moves play immediately from state s1 to (the punishment)
state s2. His offer is accepted by the old player, but then in the next
period, when the young player himself is old, he receives no cake (the
punishment); that is, the then young player’s offer, x = 1, means that
the deviator receives nothing when old. Play then reverts back to state
s1. Thus this strategy profile has the property that only “deviants”
are punished, where a deviant is defined as a young player who fails to
offer the whole cake to the old player.
We now show that the strategy profile described in Table 1 is in a
subgame perfect equilibrium for any parameter values satisfying As-
sumptions 1 and 2. The main issue is to check that when play is in
state s1, the young player has no incentive to conduct a one-shot (uni-
lateral) deviation by asking for some positive share of the cake. His
payoff from conforming (i.e., from offering the whole cake to the old
18For further discussion and illustration of this way of describing simple non-
stationary equilibria, see Muthoo (1999).
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player) is
(2) b(1 + δ) + δ2Π(0, 1)W (0).
His payoff from not conforming (i.e., from offering x > 0) is
(3) b(1 + δ) + δ2Π(x, 0)W (0),
since (as can be seen from Table 1 under “transitions”) by deviat-
ing to x > 0 the state immediately switches to state s2, where he is
punished for one period (receiving no cake when he is old), and then,
subsequently, play reverts back to the dynamically optimal state.
The only difference between the expressions in (2) and (3) is in the
survival probability. When the young player conforms he receives no
cake when young and the whole cake when old, and thus his survival
probability is Π(0, 1). But when he deviates by asking for a share x > 0
of the cake when young he obtains no cake when old, and thus, in that
case, his survival probability is Π(x, 0). Notice that his equilibrium
continuation payoffs (in the eventuality he survives death) are identical
and equal to W (0) whether or not he conforms; this is because play
reverts back to the dynamically optimal path (after the one period
punishment).
Since (by Assumption 1) Π(x, 0) is strictly increasing in x, the best
possible deviation is to set x = 1 (i.e., to ask for the whole cake when
young). Hence, a young player will not deviate to any x > 0 if and
only if
(4) Π(0, 1) > Π(1, 0).
This condition is the young player’s incentive-compatibility condition,
which is required to be satisfied in order for the dynamically optimal
outcome to be sustainable in equilibrium by the strategy profile de-
scribed in Table 1. Assumption 2, the WHYDFML Principle, implies
that inequality 4 is satisfied. Hence, we have established the following
(desired) result:
Proposition 2. Assume that θ = 1 and that Π does not satisfy in-
equality 1. Then, for any parameter values satisfying Assumptions 1
and 2, the non-stationary strategy profile described in Table 1 is in a
subgame perfect equilibrium. In equilibrium, in each period all of the
unit-size cake is obtained by the old player. The equilibrium payoff in
this (one-period punishment) equilibrium to a young player is W (0).
It is worth emphasizing that for any parameter values satisfying As-
sumptions 1 and 2, the young player has no incentive to deviate from
AGENDA POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS 19
the dynamically optimal path of play. So, although some punishment
is required to provide the young player with incentives not to devi-
ate from the dynamically optimal path, incentives can be provided for
any values of δ, b and Π provided that Π satisfies Assumptions 1 and
2. This conclusion is to be contrasted with the analogous results in
the literature on dynamic games (with and without overlapping gen-
erations). The various “folk theorems” in this literature establish that
dynamically efficient equilibria require players to be sufficiently patient.
If players don’t care enough about their future payoffs, then they will
have an incentive to deviate, and co-operation becomes unsustainable
in equilibrium. In our model, in contrast, the maximal possible gains
that a young player obtains from deviation are relatively easy to wipe
out given the WHYDFML Principle.
We now explain, as it is instructive to do so, why Proposition 2
cannot hold without the presence of a disinterested “third party” to
act as a surrogate for perfect observability. The (history-dependent)
equilibrium strategies described in Table 1 are fairly simple. In terms of
the “informational requirements” for the existence of this equilibrium,
it might appear that all that is required is for the players to have one
period memory (a very limited degree of observability). The following
informal argument shows that such a presumption is misplaced. Indeed,
as should be clear, the argument can easily be generalized to show that,
irrespective of the number m of periods of memory that players have,
this simple, non-stationary equilibrium cannot exist if m is finite; it is
necessary that m =∞ (which is the perfect observability assumption).
We argue by contradiction. Thus suppose, to the contrary, that
players have one period memory and the strategies described in Table 1
are in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Consider the following situation.
In some period t, when play is in state s1, the period-t young player
deviates from the proposed equilibrium action by asking for the whole
cake, which (according to the proposed equilibrium) he obtains. Given
the one period memory assumption, the period-(t + 1) young player
knows of this deviation in period t, and hence knows that play in
period t + 1 is in state s2. He is meant to (according to the proposed
equilibrium) ask for the whole cake for himself. We now argue that he
will not carry out that equilibrium action, which contradicts our initial
supposition. The period-(t + 1) young player knows that the period-
(t + 2) young player will not know of the deviation that took place in
period t (given the one period memory assumption). This means that
if the period-(t + 1) young player does follow the equilibrium action
and ask for the whole cake for himself, then the period-(t + 2) young
player may reasonably conclude that, in fact, the period-(t+ 1) young
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player deviated, and hence, that play in period t+2 is in state s2. The
desired conclusion is thus an immediate consequence of Assumption 2.
We conclude this analysis by drawing attention to an interesting
empirical implication of our results. If one observes the dynamically
optimal outcome in any particular organization — which is that in
each period all of the unit-size cake is obtained by the old player —
then it will not be evident (without an examination of the allocation
of agenda-setting power) whether this has arisen because players have
instituted the optimal organizational structure (θ = 0) or that a sub-
optimal organizational structure is actually in place (θ = 1), but that
the dynamically optimal outcome is being sustained in equilibrium by
the credible threat of an out-of-equilibrium punishment regime. That
is, these two explanations are observationally equivalent (on the equi-
librium path).
6. An Extension: Booms and Busts
We now extend our model by introducing the possibility of “booms”
and “busts”. Besides addressing the issue of the robustness of our main
results and insights obtained above to this extension, we also obtain
some new results and insights that inform the two central questions
under study.
The economic environment underlying our model is stable and sta-
tionary: the size of the cake (or surplus) in any period is known with
certainty at any preceding period, and moreover, its size is the same
across all periods. We now enrich the underlying economy just a lit-
tle bit by assuming that the size of the surplus in any period t is not
known with certainty in any preceding period; its size is determined at
the beginning of period t (before the proposer is randomly chosen). It
can be one of two sizes: small (of size 1), or large (of size ρ > 1). With
probability τ (where τ ∈ [0, 1]) the size of the cake is small; and thus
with probability 1− τ it is large.
It may be noted that we have therefore assumed that the size of the
cakes in any two periods is identically and independently distributed.
Thus, for example, we rule out any correlation between them. We do so
mainly in order to be able to develop in the simplest possible manner
some implications of the implied symmetric uncertainty. We leave it
for future research to address the interesting cases where some form
of correlation exists such as when the probability of having the large
surplus is relatively higher if the size of the cake in the previous period
was large.
AGENDA POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS 21
6.1. Optimal Organizational Structure. We first derive the opti-
mal organizational structure (in the absence of a disinterested “third
party”), and thus in particular explore the extent to which the results
and insights of section 4 are robust to this simple extension.
It is straightforward to see — and in fact easy to formally establish by
adapting the proof of Lemma 2 — that the result contained in Lemma
2 carries over to this extended model except that a young player’s
equilibrium expected probability of survival is no longer pi(θ); instead
it is
pi(θ) = θ2η1 + θ(1− θ)η2 + (1− θ)θΠ(0, 0) + (1− θ)2η3, where
η1 = τΠ(1, 0) + (1− τ)Π(ρ, 0)
η2 = τ
2Π(1, 1) + τ(1− τ)Π(1, ρ) + (1− τ)τΠ(ρ, 1) + (1− τ)2Π(ρ, ρ)
η3 = τΠ(0, 1) + (1− τ)Π(0, ρ).
It is worth noting — especially in order to relate (and interpret) the
results we obtain here with those obtained above in section 4 — that
although pi(θ) and pi(θ) are quantitatively different, they are qualita-
tively identical since η1, η2 and η3 are the expected probabilities of
survival of a young player in (the same) three different circumstances,
respectively: (i) when he obtains no cake when old and all the cake
when young, (ii) when he obtains all the cake both when young and
when old, and (iii) when he obtains no cake when young and all the
cake when old. Indeed, when τ = 1 or ρ = 1 then pi(θ) = pi(θ).
The optimal organizational structure is defined to be the value of
θ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes the equilibrium expected payoff
Ŵ (θ) =
b(1 + δ)
1− δ2pi(θ) .
It is easy to appropriately amend the argument in the proof of Propo-
sition 1, and establish the following result (which extends Proposition
1 to the case in which the size of the cake in any period is randomly
determined at the beginning of the period in question):
Proposition 3. Fix τ ∈ [0, 1] and ρ > 1. Now, define the following
inequality:
(5)
1
2
η2 +
1
2
Π(0, 0) > η3.
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(i) If Π satisfies inequality 5, then there exists a θ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Ŵ (.) is maximized at θ = θ̂, where
θ̂ =
η2 +Π(0, 0)− 2η3
2[η2 +Π(0, 0)− η3 − η1] .
(ii) If Π does not satisfy inequality 5, then Ŵ (.) is maximized at θ = 0.
As can be seen, the result contained in Proposition 3 is qualitatively
identical to the result contained in Proposition 1. In particular, the
results contained in Corollaries 1 and 2 carry over (but, of course, with
inequality 1 being replaced by inequality 5). As such, our main quali-
tative insights about optimal organizational structure — in particular,
that it involves allocating most (if not all) of the agenda-setting powers
to the old player — are robust to symmetric uncertainty about the size
of the surplus, or, what may be called, booms and busts.
There are however some novel insights that are implied by Propo-
sition 3 concerning the role of the size of the boom on optimal orga-
nization structure. It is easy to verify that for any τ ∈ [0, 1) there
exists a ρ̂ such that for any ρ > ρ̂ inequality 5 holds. Notice that ρ̂ is
strictly increasing in τ , and morever, ρ̂ → ∞ as τ → 1. This implies
(from Proposition 3) that if the size of the boom (relative to the bust)
in any period is sufficiently large, then it is optimal to allocate some
of the agenda-setting power to the young player. Of course, as noted
above, the conclusion of Corollary 2 is applicable, and hence the big-
ger share of that power should optimally be vested in the old player
(i.e., θ̂ < 0.5). However, it can be verified that the larger is the size of
the boom, the more power should optimally be allocated to the young
player (i.e., θ̂ is strictly increasing in ρ). In particular, in the limit as
the size of the boom becomes infinite, agenda power should be spilt
equally between the two players (i.e., θ̂ → 0.5 as ρ→∞)
These results make intuitive sense. For after all, for any given pos-
itive likelihood of a boom in any period, if the size of that boom is
sufficiently large then it is optimal (maximizing the equilibrium sur-
vival probability, and hence the equilibrium payoff) that each player
has some positive chance to get “two bites at the cherry”, once when
young and once when old.
6.2. Dynamic Optimality in a Suboptimal Structure. We now
turn to a positive analysis of this extended model, like we did in section
5.2, on the presumption that the organization has a disinterested “third
party” who acts as a surrogate for perfect observability.
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Exactly like we did in section 5.2, consider the case in which the
equilibrium organizational structure is such that the young player has
all the agenda power (θ = 1), but (since, by assumption, inequality
5 does not hold) the optimal organizational structure is one in which
the old player possesses all the power (θ = 0). This means that, like
in section 5.2, the dynamically optimal outcome is such that in each
period the young player offers the old player all of the cake ( whatever
its size turns out to be). Our aim, as before, is to derive the conditions
(if any) under which the dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained
in a necessarily non-stationary equilibrium of the extended model with
θ = 1.
We consider the strategy profile described in Table 1, but this time
we need to interpret x as the fraction of the cake, whatever its size,
to the young player; and thus 1 − x being the fraction of the cake to
the old player. By adapting the argument leading to Proposition 2, it
is easy to establish that a young player will not deviate in any period
from the proposed equilibrium action (in state s1) of offering the whole
cake to the old player, given that the realized size of the cake in the
period in question is ξ (where ξ = 1, ρ) if and only if his payoff from
conforming, which equals
b(1 + δ) + δ2[τΠ(0, 1) + (1− τ)Π(0, ρ)]Ŵ (0)
is greater than his payoff from not conforming, which equals
b(1 + δ) + δ2[τΠ(ξ, 0) + (1− τ)Π(ξ, 0)]Ŵ (0).
Since, as is intuitive, the latter payoff is larger when ξ = ρ than when
ξ = 1, it follows that the young player’s incentive-compatibility condi-
tion — which is required to be satisfied in order for the dynamically
optimal outcome to be sustainable in equilibrium by the (appropriately
re-interpreted) strategy profile described in Table 1 — is:
Π(0, ρ)− Π(ρ, 0) > τ [Π(0, ρ)− Π(0, 1)].
Notice, not surprisingly, that in the degenerate case of ρ = 1, this
latter condition would collapse to condition 4. Returning to the non-
degenerate case of ρ > 1, this incentive-compatibility condition may be
fruitfully re-written as follows:
τ < τ̂ where τ̂ ≡ Π(0, ρ)− Π(ρ, 0)
Π(0, ρ)− Π(0, 1) .(6)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that τ̂ > 0. Hence, for any parameter
values such that τ is sufficiently small (more precisely less than τ̂), the
incentive-constraint (6) is satisfied. But the question now is whether or
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not τ̂ is less than one. For if it is, then this means that for any param-
eter values such that τ > τ̂ , this incentive constraint is not satisfied,
which means that the dynamically optimal outcome cannot be sus-
tained in equilibrium in this organization with a suboptimal structure.
It is easy to see that
τ̂ T 1⇐⇒ Π(0, 1) T Π(ρ, 0).
It follows from Assumption 2 (the WHYDFML Principle) that there
exists a ρ∗ > 1 such that Π(0, 1) = Π(ρ∗, 0). Hence, it follows from
Assumption 1 that
τ̂ T 1⇐⇒ ρ∗ T ρ.
This analysis implies the following result:
Proposition 4. Assume that there exists a disinterested “third party”
in the organization who acts as a surrogate for perfect observability
about the history of the organization. Furthermore, assume that θ = 1
and that Π does not satisfy inequality 5. If the size of the boom is
sufficiently small, then, for any parameter values satisfying Assump-
tions 1 and 2, the dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained (via
a non-stationary equilibrium) in the organization with the suboptimal
structure. But if the size of the boom is sufficiently large, then this
latter conclusion holds if and only if the likelihood of a bust occurring
in any period is sufficiently small.
The intuition for these insights comes partly from the following, key
observation. If the likelihood of a boom occuring in any period is suffi-
ciently small (is a rare event) and the size of the boom is large, then the
young player has an incentive to deviate from the dynamically optimal
path, and take all the cake for himself when a (large, by hypotheses)
boom does occur — for after all, a boom is a rare event (by hypotheses).
7. Concluding Remarks
Within the context of a simple model, we have developed some an-
swers to two central questions concerning the allocation of agenda-
setting power in organizations with overlapping generations of players,
where the number of periods a player participates is endogenously de-
termined by his or her past performance.
First, we have derived results and insights concerning the optimal
allocation of such power between the two generations of players. A
main result obtained is that under a broad set of conditions, most (if
not all) of this agenda power should optimally be vested in the old
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generation of players (rather than the young generation). That is, it
is optimal to institute a seniority system within the framework of the
organization’s structure. We have, however, also identified conditions
under which the young should optimally be allocated substantial power
(although less than that allocated to the old). This should be the case,
for instance, when the underlying economic environment is subject to
shocks and exhibits very large booms. A key explanatory factor behind
all our results is the WHYDFML Principle, an arrangement in which a
player’s probability of survival in the organization is more sensitive to
benefits (cake) accruing to him when old than when young — in effect,
a “contract renewal” process exhibiting a recency bias.
Second, we have derived results and insights concerning the con-
ditions under which the dynamically optimal outcome is sustainable
in organizations with suboptimal structures in equilibrium (owing to
the presence of transactions costs). One important condition is for
the organization in question to have a disinterested “third party” who
acts as a surrogate for perfect observability about the history of the
organization. Under a broad set of conditions, we showed (by ap-
pealing in particular to the WHYDFML Principle) that dynamic ef-
ficiency is sustainable in such an organization via the mechanism of
inter-generational co-operation. However, under some conditions, dy-
namic optimality is unsustainable. This is the case, for instance, when
the economic environment is subject to shocks, and exhibits large and
rare booms.
Several extensions and generalizations suggest themselves, some of
which are the subject of a sequel to the present paper.
• We have seen how perturbations — “booms and busts” as we
called them — affect the robustness of intertemporal deals. In deriving
our results we assumed, more for convenience than for any substantive
reason, that perturbations were uncorrelated. It would be of great
interest, however, to determine the effect on equilibrium of alternative
correlated structures.
• An organization containing two generations is the simplest OLG
setting in which to examine agenda power and multi-period bargaining.
Additional generations introduces accounting complexity, but also less-
than-unanimous decision rules and the possibility of coalitions among
generations. Related to this, multiple agents per generation adds rich-
ness and complexity. Each of these extensions would add realism to
our model.
• We regard a period t old agent who is re-appointed in period t+1
as identical to a newly minted period t + 1 young agent. It would be
enlightening to consider a role for experience, for example one in which
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the probability of reappointment is affected by the number of previous
“terms” served. This amounts to introducing an incumbency effect as a
proxy for “competence”. The competence of agents, in turn, will effect
the size of the cake available for distribution. It would be of interest
to derive the ways in which such an effect impacts the allocation of
agenda power and outcomes in equilibrium.
• In many applications the “cake” that is bargained over by agents
can be consumed by the principals only with a lag. A public project,
for example, may be secured by a legislator, but is only realized and
then enjoyed by his or her constituents some years later. In effect, the
probability-of-reappointment function impounds a “credit-claiming” tech-
nology. We have explicitly recognized monotonicity and a recency bias
(WHYDFML), but otherwise have assumed that cake produced in pe-
riod t is also consumed in that period. It would be of interest to
determine the effect on equilibrium bargaining of time lags, and the
ways they interact with the WHYDFML Principle.
• Finally, as noted earlier (see footnote 11), endogenizing the bar-
gaining procedure would extend our argument to “constitutional mo-
ments” and provide some insight about the conditions under which
take-it-or-leave-it bargaining emerges. In some settings this would be
facilitated by bringing the principals into the analysis as strategic play-
ers. In such settings there may well be other features of agent interac-
tions on which principals might contract such as agent compensation b
and agent re-selection Π.
In sum, agenda power matters. Its allocation amongst the key play-
ers in any (economic, political or social) organization has a crucial
impact not only on the economic distribution of the benefits amongst
the players, but also on the extent to which the organization is able to
sustain the dynamically optimal outcome.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix θ ∈ [0, 1]. Given Lemma 1, we need to
derive the set of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE). A SSPE
is characterized in particular by a pair of numbers, which we denote by ky
and ko, where (for each i = y, o) ki and 1−ki are respectively the equilibrium
shares of the cake to the young and old players offered by player i (in any
period and for any history of the game up until that period) if he is chosen
to make the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. It is straightforward to verify that
in any SSPE, player i’s equilibrium offer ki is accepted by player j (j 6= i).
Given this result, we now proceed to characterize the unique SSPE.
Fix an arbitrary SSPE. Letting V denote the expected payoff in this
SSPE to a young player (at the beginning of any period, before the proposer
AGENDA POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS 27
is randomly chosen), it follows that V satisfies the following (recursive)
equation:
V = b(1 + δ) + δ2γV, where
γ = θ2Π(ky, 1−ky)+θ(1−θ)Π(ky, 1−ko)+(1−θ)θΠ(ko, 1−ky)+(1−θ)2Π(ko, 1−ko).
Hence,
V =
b(1 + δ)
1− δ2γ .
From the One-Shot Deviation Principle19, it follows that player i (i = y, o)
has no incentive to deviate by making an offer that differs from the equi-
librium offer ki if and only if ki maximizes Pi(x) over x ∈ [0, 1] subject to
Pj(x) ≥ Dj (j 6= i), where
Py(x) = b(1 + δ) + δ2[θΠ(x, 1− ky) + (1− θ)Π(x, 1− ko)]V
Po(x) = b+ δΠ(z, 1− x)V
Dy = b(1 + δ) + δ2[θΠ(0, 1− ky) + (1− θ)Π(0, 1− ko)]V
Do = b+ δΠ(z, 0)V,
where z denotes the amount of cake obtained by the old player in the pre-
vious period (when he was young). Since Py(x) is increasing in x and Po(x)
is decreasing in x, it immediately follows that there exists a unique SSPE,
namely, ky = 1 and ko = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Maximizing W over θ is, of course, equiv-
alent to maximizing pi over θ. Differentiating pi w.r.t. θ, we obtain:
∂pi
∂θ
= 2αθ + β, where
α = Π(1, 0) + Π(0, 1)−Π(1, 1)−Π(0, 0)
β = Π(1, 1) + Π(0, 0)− 2Π(0, 1).
First, we consider the case in which β > 0 (i.e., inequality 1 holds). Then
since
α+ β = Π(1, 0)−Π(0, 1)
is strictly negative (by Assumption 2), it follows that α < 0. Now note that
2α+ β = −β + 2[Π(1, 0)−Π(0, 1)],
which is strictly negative (by Assumption 2 and since, by hypothesis, β > 0).
Finally note that since α < 0, it follows that pi is strictly concave in θ.
Putting these results together, it follows that we have established that pi is
increasing in θ over the interval [0, θ∗), decreasing over the interval (θ∗, 1]
19The One-Shot Deviation Principle, which is also known by other terms, is
essentially the principle of optimality for discounted dynamic programming. A
strategy profile is in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if each player’s
strategy is immune to profitable one-shot (unilateral) deviations.
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and achieves a maximum at θ = θ∗, where θ∗ = −β/2α. Hence, we have
established the first part of the proposition.
Now consider the case in which β < 0 (i.e., inequality 1 does not hold).
We break our argument into three cases. First suppose that α < 0. This
immediately implies that pi is maximized at θ = 0 (since pi is in this case
decreasing and strictly concave in θ). Now suppose that 0 < α < −β/2. In
this case pi is also maximized at θ = 0 (since pi in this case is decreasing
but strictly convex in θ). Finally suppose that α > −β/2. In this case pi
is strictly convex in θ, decreasing in θ over some interval (0, θ′), achieves a
minimum at θ′ and is increasing over the interval (θ′, 1). This implies that
pi achieves a maximum either at θ = 0 or at θ = 1. The desired conclusion
follows immediately, since (by Assumption 2) pi(0) > pi(1).
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